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RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND “SUPER-RISK”
JOSE´ LUIS BERMU´DEZ* & MICHAEL S. PARDO**
ABSTRACT
Risk is a pervasive feature of law and public policy.  Decision-making in
these domains often takes place in the absence of certainty and with aware-
ness that errors may be made and predictions may fail.  Within law—as
within the social and physical sciences, medicine, economics, finance, and
countless other domains—a primary focus of practical and scholarly
inquiries is the extent to which risks can be measured and managed.  In
each of these domains, risk analysis typically employs the basic tools of
decision theory (probability and utility) to measure the likelihood as well as
the costs and benefits associated with possible outcomes.  Risk analysis also
often makes use of the familiar (but confusing) distinction between deci-
sions made in conditions of “risk” (roughly, the relevant likelihoods and
costs are quantifiable) and decisions made in conditions of “uncertainty”
(roughly, the possibilities are either unknown or not amenable to
quantification).
Beginning with the risk-uncertainty distinction, but altering its terminol-
ogy, we argue that there is a fundamentally important type of risk that has
been systematically ignored.  We call it “super-risk.”  Super-risk occurs
when, at the time of decision, decision-makers believe they are in conditions
of risk (what we call “actuarial decision-making”), but they do not know
whether they are in an actuarial or an uncertain environment.  Super-risk
gives rise to a particular type of inferential problem, with significant practi-
cal consequences, when decision-makers proceed under the assumption that
they are in an actuarial environment but they are in fact in an uncertain
one.  Super-risk has the potential to arise in any decision-making domain
with uncertain outcomes, but it is more prone to arise with decision-making
in domains such as law, public policy, economics, finance, and the social
sciences rather than in domains such as the physical sciences, medicine,
and insurance.  Our goal in this Article is to introduce the general idea of
super-risk and to explain its features and sources.
INTRODUCTION
Risk is pervasive in law and public policy.  To illustrate this risk,
consider two seemingly disparate examples: financial regulation and tri-
als.  Decision-making in each of these domains is made in conditions of
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risk, and legal rules promulgated in both domains focus on the appro-
priate levels and distribution of this risk.  For instance, capital require-
ments on banks are a type of financial regulation designed to manage
risk.1  Similarly, burdens and standards of proof are used at trial to pro-
tect against “the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process.”2  In
addition to these specific examples, the law generally regulates deci-
sion-making by individuals, corporations, industries, and the govern-
ment as they operate in uncertain environments.  Environmental
regulations, food and drug safety, tort law, criminal law, property law,
contract law, and constitutional law all involve decision-making under
such conditions.3
In most domains—including law, public policy, the physical and
social sciences, medicine, and technology—a standard theoretical
framework is used to understand, measure, and manage risk.4  This
framework employs probabilistic models and statistical information to
predict possible outcomes.  The basic conception of risk underlying
1. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25
(2010) (“For banks, regulatory capital [requirements] cushion[ ] against the risk of loss
from a portfolio of loans, . . .” among other things.).
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that burdens of proof
and other procedural rules regulating the process of legal proof “are shaped by the risk of
error inherent in the truth-finding process[.]” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757
(1982) (internal quotation omitted).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection of Envi-
ronmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1792 (2011) (“Much of environ-
mental law involves principles for determining the seriousness of risk and the extent to
which society should invest in reducing those risks.”); Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individu-
alized Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1164–69
(2005) (discussing risk assessment by the Food and Drug Administration); Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 33 (1972) (conceptualizing negligence in
terms of the costs associated with preventing expected harm); Jonathan Remy Nash, The
Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 171,
172 (2012) (“Criminal law provides a natural home for risk regulation.”); Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1724 (2004) (“The problem of informa-
tion in protecting property is characterized not just by risk but also by varying degrees of
uncertainty.  First-order production of information on the relevant asset or class of assets
involves not only managing risk, but also turning uncertainty into more manageable
risk.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L. J. 541, 550 (2003) (advancing a wealth-maximization theory of contract law on the
ground that firms are “risk neutral” and seek to maximize expected profits); Adrian
Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 181, 181 (2012)
(applying “the insights of risk analysis” from disciplines such as “decision theory and
game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology” to “constitutional law
and theory”).
4. See, e.g., L. Jonathan Cohen, Bayesian versus Baconianism in the Evaluation of Medi-
cal Diagnoses, 31 BRIT. J. PHI. SCI. 45 (1980) (“Medicine is an excellent example of a field
in which it is often necessary to make inferences under conditions of uncertainty, either
because further delays in therapy would be too risky or because further tests or examina-
tions would be too costly.”); JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE
ch. 3 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing statistical models in the social sciences and economics);
MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDG-
MENT 24–53 (2005) (discussing statistical prediction rules in different domains, including
the social sciences, medicine, and law); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical versus Actuarial
Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (1989) (advocating for the use of probabilistic models of deci-
sion-making in any domain for which empirically established relations are available).
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these models involves three components: (1) possible outcomes or
states of the world; (2) costs or benefits associated with each outcome
or state; and (3) probabilities or likelihoods that each outcome or state
obtains or will obtain.5
This basic conception of risk is the starting point of this Article,
which argues that there is a conceptually distinct type of risk, called
“super-risk,” which is fundamentally important and systematically
ignored.  The goals of this Article are to introduce the general concept
of super-risk and to explain its features and sources.  For reasons
explored in-depth in this Article, super-risk has the potential to arise in
decision-making in any of the aforementioned domains; however, it is
more likely to arise in the domains of law, public policy, economics,
finance, and the social sciences, than in the domains of medicine, the
physical sciences, and insurance.  The concept of super-risk is illus-
trated by detailed examples from law and finance.  Thereafter, decision-
making in the contexts of law and finance is contrasted with decision-
making in the contexts of science, medicine, and insurance.  All of the
examples discussed herein are intended to illuminate the more general
phenomenon and its features across all domains.
In order to properly understand the concept of super-risk, one
must first understand Frank Knight’s familiar, but confusing distinction
between decisions made under conditions of “risk” and decisions made
under conditions of “uncertainty.”6  Decisions under risk involve cir-
cumstances in which the probabilities and costs associated with possible
outcomes can be quantified; whereas decisions under uncertainty involve
circumstances in which the probabilities and costs associated with possi-
ble outcomes are not amenable to quantification.7 Super-risk arises
when, at the time of a decision, the decision-maker believes she is mak-
ing decisions in conditions of risk, when she is actually in conditions of
uncertainty.  Furthermore, this scenario creates the possibility for a par-
ticular type of inferential error.8
The first context in which the Article illustrates super-risk—finan-
cial decision-making—is discussed against the backdrop of recent finan-
cial crises.  Scholars have identified various causes and conditions
giving rise to these crises.9  This Article argues that super-risk was also a
5. The standard conception of risk is based on the theory of expected utility. See
generally RICHARD C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION (2d ed. 1983); R. DUNCAN LUCE &
HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957).  For
an overview, see JOSE´ LUIS BERMU´DEZ, DECISION THEORY AND RATIONALITY (2009).  Decision
theorists and economists have proposed alternatives to the expected utility theory. See,
e.g., Chris Starmer, Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive
Theory of Choice Under Risk, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 332 (2000); Robert Sugden, Why Be Consistent?
A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in Choice Theory, 52 ECONOMICA 167 (1985).
6. FRANK H. KNIGHT, Preface to the First Edition of RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT
19–20 (5th impression 1940).
7. Id.
8. As we will explain, super-risk is a special case of “epistemic risk,” or the risk that
one’s assessment of risk is faulty. See Peter Ga¨rdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Unreliable
Probabilities, Risk Bearing, and Decision Making, 33 SYNTHESE 361 (1982).
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY (2010).
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cause of the financial crises.  More specifically, this Article contends
that super-risk was one of the root causes of recent market turmoil and
the investment catastrophe.
The second context in which this Article illustrates super-risk—
fact-finding at trial—is discussed against the backdrop of the body of
literature exploring the role of probability in theoretical and doctrinal
accounts of evidence and proof, on one hand, and the role of statistical
evidence in the litigation process, on the other.  Understanding the
nature of super-risk contributes insight to both aspects of this literature.
With regard to theoretical and doctrinal accounts of the evidentiary
proof process, super-risk provides a conceptual challenge for conceiv-
ing of legal proof or evidence doctrine (e.g., standards of proof) in
probabilistic terms.10  With regard to statistical evidence at trial (and
other litigation stages), super-risk illustrates a particular inferential
problem facing legal decision-makers.  This inferential problem may
lead not only to erroneous decisions in individual cases, but also to sys-
tematic errors in cases of “aggregate” litigation, such as class actions,
multidistrict litigation, and proposals for “trial sampling” (most notably
in the context of mass torts).11
Part I of the Article discusses Knight’s distinction between risk and
uncertainty.  Part II illustrates how risk is measured in financial deci-
sion-making.  Part III illustrates how similar methods are applied to
legal adjudication.  Part IV details the general features of super-risk,
and Part V explains how and why super-risk arises.
I. KNIGHT’S DISTINCTION
Economists and social scientists oftentimes distinguish between
“risk” and “uncertainty” in decision-making.12  The distinction is pro-
foundly important, but the terminology is confusing.  Generally, risk
and uncertainty are related concepts, not distinct ones—what makes
something risky is that there is uncertainty about how it will turn out.
This Article will refer to “decision-making under risk” as “actuarial deci-
sion-making,” for reasons that will emerge in the discussion below.
Two examples are offered to illustrate Knight’s distinction between
the two related concepts.  In the first example, a woman is agonizing
over whether to leave her job and start a business.  In the second exam-
ple, an insurer is calculating the premium for a life insurance policy
with the insured’s spouse and children as the beneficiaries.  The deci-
sions of the woman and the insurer illustrate different forms of risk.
For instance, the insurer can, in principle, quantify the probability of
10. In this respect, super-risk joins a list of other conceptual problems with proba-
bilistic accounts. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 604 (1994); ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005); LARRY LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (2006).
11. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97 (2009); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571
(2012); Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials are Better than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective on
Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (2012).
12. KNIGHT, supra note 6.
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different potential outcomes, and is thus able to predict what will
occur.13  Pursuant to Knight’s distinction, the insurer’s ability to assign
numerical probabilities to the different outcomes represents a case of
decision-making under risk.14  Life insurers have access to actuarial
tables with, for example, huge databases of mortality rates.15  Because
of these tables, an insurer writing a life insurance policy is in a much
stronger position (information-wise) than the person buying the policy.
With an actuarial table in hand, an insurer can calculate a premium
that would on average be profitable for her company, given the likeli-
hood that people like you will die within the term of the policy and the
payout that would then have to be made.16
Decision-making under “uncertainty” includes cases where deci-
sion-makers are not in a position to quantify the probabilities of differ-
ent outcomes.17  Decision-makers are not necessarily clueless about the
likelihood of potential outcomes (although they might be), but they do
not know how certain any of the possible outcomes are.  The first exam-
ple illustrates decision-making under uncertainty: staying in her job
may be a predictable outcome, but several factors must be considered
in order to quantify the likelihood of this happening.  For instance, the
likely financial health of the company, the possibility of a corporate
takeover, and whether she can find another job must be determined
before the probability of any one outcome can be calculated.  In short,
in decision-making under uncertainty, such as the woman’s dilemma,
there are too many unknown variables to consider in order to accu-
rately predict the likelihood of potential outcomes.18
13. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 71–77 (1921) (referring
to the amount of evidence or information on which such probabilities are based as their
“weight”).  Both weighty and non-weighty probabilities can give rise to super-risk.  More
generally, super-risk can arise whether or not a decision is epistemically justified.
14. KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 19–20.
15. STEPHEN SENN, DICING WITH DEATH: CHANCE, RISK, AND HEALTH (2003).
16. This type of decision-making is not limited to the insurance context; rather it is
a staple of decision-making throughout the sciences, medicine, finance, and public pol-
icy. See Dawes et al., supra note 4, at 1668 (arguing in favor of this mode of decision-
making generally, and explaining that it can be employed in any domain for which the
relevant data are available: “[a]ctuarial output statements, or conclusions, can address
virtually any type of diagnosis, description, or prediction of human interest”; to be “truly
actuarial,” judgments “must be both automatic . . . and based on empirically established
relations”).
17. KNIGHT, supra note 6.
18. Some statisticians and decision theorists, particularly those who follow strict
Bayesianism, believe that a rational agent should always be able to assign numerical
probabilities to outcomes. See LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954)
(the locus classicus of strict Bayesianism).  Even as an unattainable ideal, however, it does
not seem desirable to require rational agents to have unique probability functions.  This is
one lesson to be derived from the Ellsberg paradox. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity,
and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961). See also Ga¨rdenfors & Sahlin, supra note
8; Isaac Levi, On Indeterminate Probabilities, 71 J. PHIL. 391 (1974); Isaac Levi, The Paradoxes
of Allais and Ellsberg, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 23 (1986) [hereinafter Levi, Paradoxes]; Isaac Levi,
Compromising Bayesianism: A Plea for Indeterminacy, 25 J. STAT. PLANNING & INFERENCE 347
(1990).
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II. MEASURING RISK IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Now consider a third example: an investor thinking about buying
shares in a particular company.  How should we think about this type of
decision: Is it similar to the insurer or the woman deciding whether to
quit her job?  The orthodoxy in the financial world is that investment
decisions are actuarial.  There are many different models for valuing
companies and portfolios.  These models have built-in tools for measur-
ing the different types of risk that an investor faces.
Many of these models are variations on something called the “Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model” (“CAPM”).19  The CAPM is a way of calculating
how much investors should be compensated for the risk they run in
buying a particular financial asset.  The basic idea is very intuitive.  The
more risk you run, the greater the return that you are justified in
expecting from the asset.  And the return that you can expect from the
asset needs to be reflected in its price.
In order to apply this intuitive idea, we need a way of measuring
risk.  In the CAPM, risk and return are intimately connected.  A cor-
rectly priced asset will yield a return that reflects the risk the investor is
taking on.  The greater the risk, the higher the return.  The lower the
risk, the lower the return.  The first step in understanding the CAPM is
to understand two fundamental benchmarks.  These benchmarks are
the starting points for working out how much you need to be compen-
sated for holding a particular asset.  They are:
Benchmark 1 = the risk-free rate of return.  This is the return that an
investor can expect to receive without running any risk at all.  The
risk-free rate of return is standardly measured by interest rates on
US Treasury bills of appropriate duration, or some equally secure
investment.
Benchmark 2 = the expected market rate of return.  This is the return
that the market as a whole is expected to yield.  This might be
measured in terms of the expected return of some asset designed
to track the behavior of the entire stock market—an index fund
tracking the Standard and Poor’s 500 in the United States, for
example, or the Financial Times All Share Index in the United
Kingdom.
If we subtract Benchmark 1 from Benchmark 2, then we get what is
known as the market risk premium.  This is the extra return that we can
expect for taking on the risk associated with holding the market, as
opposed to sitting safely with Treasury bills, or government-guaranteed
savings accounts.  If, for example, the return on a two-year Treasury bill
is 3% and the expected return on, say, the Barclay’s corporate bond
19. The Capital Asset Pricing Model was developed independently in William F.
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN.
425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); and Jan Mossin, Equi-
librium in a Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768 (1966). See also PETER L. BERN-
STEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING (2007) (provides an accessible overview of the CAPM).
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index is 7%, then the market risk premium is 4%.  In essence, valuing a
particular risky asset is identifying the correct risk premium for that
asset.  We know what the risk-free rate of return is—we know what
return we can get without running any risk at all.  What we need to
know is how much extra return to expect from holding the risky asset.
One obvious question to ask is: How risky is this asset relative to the
market as a whole?  If the asset is less risky than the market, then the
risk premium for the asset should be less than the market risk pre-
mium.  If, on the other hand, the asset is riskier than the market, then
it should have a higher risk premium.
This is where the elegance of the CAPM comes in.  It gives a way of
measuring the riskiness of a given asset relative to the riskiness of the
market as a whole.  Once we do that we can use the market risk pre-
mium to work out what return we should expect from our risky asset.
The key idea behind measuring risk in the CAPM is that the risk of an
asset is measured in terms of its volatility.  The more volatile an asset,
the riskier it is.  Imagine two stocks, both of which increase in price by
5% over the course of a year.  Suppose that the price of one stock
increases steadily over the year, while the other gyrates wildly over the
same period, going from a high of +15% to a low of -15%.  It is natural
to think that the second stock is riskier than the first.  For one thing,
the more volatile it is the greater the chance that if you need to cash in
early you will end up taking a loss.
If we know how volatile the market as a whole is, and also how
volatile the risky asset is, then we can work out the volatility of the asset
relative to the volatility of the market.  If the asset is more volatile than
the market, then it is riskier than the market—and if less volatile, then
less risky.  This is the asset’s relative volatility.
A measure of relative volatility is almost enough to allow us to work
out the return we should expect from our asset—that is, the percentage
of the amount invested that an investor holding that asset can expect to
gain or lose.  Intuitively, the expected return should be determined by
the market risk premium and the volatility.  If the asset is more volatile
than the market, then the expected return should be higher than the
market risk premium—and if it is less volatile, then it should be lower.
In other words, we should be paid more for holding an asset that is
riskier than the market than we get paid for holding the market.
The only thing missing is a way of representing how closely related
the risky asset is with the market as a whole.  This is sometimes called
the correlation coefficient between the return on the asset and the return
on the market.  The closer the correlation, the more importance we
need to attach to the relative volatility.  The correlation can be repre-
sented by a number between 1 and -1.  If the correlation is 1, then the
asset and the market are perfectly correlated:  they move up and down
together.  If the correlation is -1, then they are inversely correlated:
one goes up exactly when the other goes down.
Combining relative volatility and the correlation coefficient results
in what is known as the beta of a risky asset.  The beta of a stock is
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standardly taken to be a measure of how risky the stock is relative to the
market as a whole.  This allows us to calculate the return we should
expect from the asset we are trying to value.  In order to calculate the
expected return, we start with the risk-free rate—since that’s what we
can get anyway.  We then add to it the rate that we get by multiplying
the market risk premium by the asset’s beta.
That, in essence, is the thinking behind the Capital Asset Pricing
Model.  The basic ideas are:
1. The price of an asset is fixed by the return that can be expected
from it.
2. The expected return is fixed by how risky it is relative to the
market as a whole.
3. The asset’s riskiness relative to the market as a whole is fixed by
a) How volatile it is relative to the volatility of the market.
b) How correlated its returns are with the returns of the
market.
We have presented the CAPM as informally as possible.  But the
reason the model is so powerful and has been so influential is that there
are ways of assigning numbers to each of the crucial parameters—to the
relative volatility of the risky asset and to its correlation coefficient with
the market.
How do we calculate relative volatility and correlation coefficients?
We only have access to historical data, so that’s all we can use.  The
relative volatility of two assets is typically calculated by comparing their
individual volatility ratings over a given historical period.  One very
common way of looking at how volatile an asset is over a particular
period of time is to look at how much it diverges from its average price
during that period.  This is what statisticians call standard deviation.
Suppose, for example, that you are interested in the volatility of
shares of Main Street Bank over a twelve-month period.  The first thing
to do is work out the average price of a share for that period.  Then you
need to decide how fine-grained you want your volatility analysis to be.
Are you interested in monthly fluctuations?  Weekly?  Daily?  Or per-
haps even more fine-grained than that—hourly, for example?
Suppose that you are interested in day-to-day volatility.  Then for
each day in the year you can measure the gap between the price on that
day (perhaps the price at closing) and the average price over the twelve-
month period.  If on most days the share price is only a little above or
below the average price, then Main Street Bank stock is not very vola-
tile.  But if there are many days when the share price is a long way above
or below the twelve-month average, then it is highly volatile.  Calculat-
ing the standard deviation is an easy way of measuring the degree of
volatility (particularly if you have a spreadsheet program).
Suppose you know the historical volatility of Main Street Bank and
the historical volatility of the market (for example, the Standard and
Poor’s 500) and you want to work out their relative volatility.  All you
need to do is to divide the first by the second.  The relative volatility of
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Main Street Bank and the S & P 500 over a given period is given by the
ratio of their individual volatilities over that period.  And so, if the vola-
tility of a financial asset is measured by that asset’s standard deviation,
then we have an easy and precise way of measuring relative volatility.
The correlation coefficient is also not hard to calculate, although
the calculations are a little harder to describe.  As mentioned earlier,
the result of the calculations is a number between 1 and -1.  If the corre-
lation coefficient is 1 then the two assets are perfectly correlated.  Per-
fectly correlated assets move perfectly in step with each other.  When
one goes up or down, so does the other.  If the correlation coefficient is
-1, in contrast, they are exactly inversely correlated.  This means that
when one goes down by a certain amount, the other goes up by that
same amount.
So, putting all this together, we can see how the CAPM makes cer-
tain types of investment decisions look very much like instances of actu-
arial decision-making.  We can assign numbers to measure the risk and
use those numbers to arrive at a view of the correct price for the asset.
And the CAPM is just an example.  There are many other models and
variations upon models, all with the same aim—to find a way of measur-
ing risk and to show how those measurements can be used to make
investment decisions.20
III. MEASURING RISK IN ADJUDICATION
Now consider a fourth example: a judge or jury finding facts at
trial.  How should we think about this type of decision: Is it similar to
the insurer or to the woman deciding whether to quit her job?  The
primary risk in adjudication is an erroneous outcome.  Errors in this
context include both false negatives (failing to find a fact proven when
it is true) and false positives (finding a fact proven when it is false).
Both types of errors impose considerable costs on parties and society.
The conventional theoretical account of adjudicative risk relies on the
same basic conceptual tools (e.g., probability and utility) as the finan-
cial context, and it conceives of decision-making as actuarial.
The law manages risk in adjudication with burdens and standards
of proof.21  For any disputed factual issue that is material to the deter-
mination of a lawsuit, the law assigns one party with the burden of
proof and a standard by which the issue must be proven.  For example,
in civil cases, the plaintiff must typically prove the elements of her claim
by a “preponderance of the evidence,” and, in criminal cases, the prose-
20. Critical discussions of the CAPM and its predictive accuracy include Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25 (2004); Fischer Black et al., The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests, in
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 1972).
21. Additional evidentiary rules regulate the admissibility of evidence; these rules
also function, in part, to minimize and allocate the risk of error.
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cution must prove the elements of each crime “beyond a reasonable
doubt” (“BARD”).22
The conventional account of how burdens and standards of proof
are thought to measure and manage risk can be illustrated with
probability theory.  The “preponderance” standard is thought to mini-
mize the risk of error and to allocate the risk of error roughly equally
between the parties.23  To illustrate this, we can conceive of the stan-
dards as requiring a probabilistic threshold of certainty in the truth of
the proven fact, with 1 equaling certain truth and 0 equaling certain
falsity.  For the preponderance standard, this threshold is convention-
ally taken to be 0.5.24  If the plaintiff proves the issue beyond 0.5, then
the plaintiff wins on the issue (and the fact is considered “proven” for
purposes of a legal judgment); if not, the plaintiff loses (and the fact is
considered “not proven”).  The risk of error is considered to be shared
roughly equally because each side is sharing a roughly equal probability
space.25  If the fact is proven between 0 and 0.5, the plaintiff will lose
even though the fact alleged may be true (a false negative).  If the fact
is proven between 0.51 and 1, then the plaintiff will win even though
the fact alleged may be false (a false positive).
Under this account, total risk is thought to be minimized for the
following reasons.  Suppose a plaintiff proves an issue to 0.8 and thus
wins.  In 100 similar cases in which plaintiffs win, we would expect 80 of
those cases to be correctly determined and 20 to be errors (similarly for
100 cases that defendants win when the issue is proven to 0.2).  When
the issue is proven to 0.6, we would expect 60 correct decisions and 40
errors, and so on.  A “0.5 rule” is thought to minimize “total expected
errors” because it specifies outcomes based on which outcome is more
probable.26  When the rule is above or below 0.5, additional expected
errors follow.  For example, with a “0.4 rule,” plaintiffs will win in cases
proven between 0.4 and 0.5, even though the disputed facts are more
likely to be false than true.27  In 100 cases proven to 0.45—and thus all
22. On the preponderance standard, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
(1991); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). On the BARD
standard, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (“[T]he preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results
in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345–46 (7th Cir. 1988).
All burdens of persuasion deal with probabilities. The preponderance standard
is a more-likely-than-not rule, under which the trier of fact rules for the plaintiff
if it thinks the chance greater than 0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right. The
reasonable doubt standard is much higher, perhaps 0.9 or better. The clear-and-
convincing standard is somewhere in between.
Id.
25. “Roughly” because issues right at the threshold of 0.5 result in victories for the
defendant.
26. See STEIN, supra note 10, at 144; David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 487 (1982).
27. The disputed facts are considered more likely to be false under this account
because the judgments are taken to conform to the axiom that the probability of a pro-
position and its negation equal 1. Therefore, if the probability of a disputed fact being
true is, say, 0.45, then the probability that it is false will be (1 – 0.45) = 0.55.
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plaintiff victories under a “0.4 rule”—this would result in expected
results of 45 correct decisions and 55 errors (false positives).  Similar
conclusions would apply to a “0.6 rule”: in 100 cases proven to 0.55,
these cases would all result in victories for the defendants and there
would be 55 expected errors (false negatives).
This analytical approach to measuring and managing the risk of
adjudicative error works by making two important (and simplifying)
assumptions: The assumptions are that (1) the base rate for deserving
parties on either side will be equal, and (2) the quantified value of the
evidence matches reality.  If either of these two assumptions does not
hold, then the actual errors produced may diverge significantly from
the expected results.  For example, if all civil plaintiffs who go to trial
have true claims and deserve to win, then the only actual errors that can
occur are false negatives (no matter where the burden and standard of
proof is set, and vice versa if none deserve to win).  Moreover, if cases
involve poor evidence or poorly understood evidence, then additional
actual errors may follow in either direction.  For example, if no plaintiff
can acquire sufficient evidence to surpass a 0.5 threshold, then all plain-
tiffs will lose, regardless of how many deserve to win on the merits; like-
wise, all plaintiffs may win if it is easy to generate evidence that
surpasses this threshold, regardless of the merits of the case.
The discussion thus far has focused on one of the twin aspects of a
decision-theoretic approach to adjudicative risk: probability.  The other
primary component—utility—also factors into the analysis.  The analy-
sis above regarding the preponderance standard assumed that the cost
associated with each type of error is roughly equal (and likewise for the
benefits associated with each type of correct judgment).  If these costs
are not equal, then a higher or lower probabilistic threshold will be
necessary in order to minimize the expected error costs.28  One
approach along these lines would be to calculate an optimal standard
on a case-by-case basis based on the utilities associated with each of the
four possible trial outcomes (false positive, false negative, true positive,
and true negative).29  Although the law considers the relative costs of
errors in setting the standard, it generally rejects such a fine-grained
approach,30 adopting instead a general taxonomy based on the types of
cases: the high “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for the elements
28. The BARD standard in criminal cases is justified on the ground that false posi-
tives (convicting the innocent) are more costly than false negatives (acquitting the guilty).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979) (“In the administration of criminal justice, our society
imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.  This is accomplished by requiring
under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968).
29. See Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof:
Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT’L COMM. EVID. 3–4 (2009).
30. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 42
U.S. 319 (1976)) (“Standards of proof, like other ‘procedural due process rules[,] are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the general-
ity of cases[ ] . . . .’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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of crimes31; the preponderance standard for most civil causes of action
and many affirmative defenses (criminal and civil);32 and in some juris-
dictions an intermediate “clear and convincing evidence” standard for
civil cases in which the relative costs of errors are thought to be suffi-
ciently unequal.33
Higher standards of proof, such as beyond a reasonable doubt, are
thus thought to skew the risk of error in one direction.  If the BARD
standard is conceived as a probabilistic threshold beyond, say, 0.9, then
the prosecution bears the risk of error for issues proven between 0 and
0.9, which would result in acquittals.  And defendants bear the risk of
error for issues proven between 0.91 and 1, which would result in con-
victions.  The prosecution thus bears a risk of error for issues proven
beyond 0.5 and up to 0.9—these issues are considered “not proven”
even though they are more likely to be true than false.
To illustrate this account of adjudicative risk, consider the follow-
ing examples.  Suppose legal fact-finders (judges or juries) must make
four factual determinations: (1) whether a bus involved in a traffic acci-
dent was owned by a particular civil defendant; (2) whether a carpet
fiber found at a crime scene came from a particular criminal defen-
dant’s home; (3) the amount of drugs smuggled by a criminal defen-
dant; and (4) the amount of injuries suffered by civil plaintiffs all of
whom were injured by the same product.  One primary difference
between these examples and those discussed above is that adjudication
typically involves inferences about what happened in the past (“postdic-
tions”) as opposed to predictions about future events.34  Despite this
difference, however, the relevant inferential issues are the same.35  We
discuss each example in turn.
Suppose that in the bus-accident scenario the plaintiff could prove
that a bus caused the accident but could not prove the color of the
bus.36  The defendant owns the Blue Bus Company, which operates
eighty percent of the buses in the town where the accident occurred.
Assuming no other evidence, conventional expected-error analysis sug-
gests that it is therefore 0.8 likely that the defendant’s bus caused the
accident.  If the standard of proof is conceived as proof beyond 0.5,
then the plaintiff should win.  Moreover, in 100 similar cases, we would
expect 80 correct decisions and 20 errors (false positives).
31. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
33. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24.
34. Some adjudicative decisions do, however, involve predictions about future con-
ditions (e.g., predicting future dangerousness), as well as inferences about current condi-
tions (e.g., injuries).
35. We note that there are important differences in how people perceive prediction
and postdiction and that these differences are relevant to some legal issues. See Ehud
Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 467 (2008).
36. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 156–58 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
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In the carpet fiber scenario, suppose a robbery has occurred and
the police locate a carpet fiber at the crime scene that did not come
from any carpets in the house that was robbed.37  At trial, an expert
testifies for the prosecution that “based on manufacturing records, the
frequency of the recovered fiber in carpets is less than 1 in 500.”  The
expert testifies further that the fiber recovered at the scene matches a
sample of carpet taken from the defendant’s home.  Conventional
expected-error analysis determines the “probative value” of the evi-
dence based on a concept known as the likelihood ratio—which measures
the probability of this evidence (a match) given a hypothesis (the
defendant committed the crime), divided by the probability of this evi-
dence (a match) given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant
did not commit the crime).38  In the carpet fiber example, the
probability of the evidence, assuming guilt, is (we will assume) 1.  The
probability of the evidence, assuming innocence, is derived from the 1
in 500 number, or 0.002 (1/500), which results in a likelihood ratio of
500 to 1.  Assuming this is the only evidence offered by the prosecution,
the defendant’s probability of guilt is 0.998 (500/501), which would
overcome a decision standard of beyond 0.9.  Moreover, in 1,000 simi-
lar cases, it is expected that there would be 998 correct decisions (true
convictions) and 2 errors (false convictions).
These bus-accident and carpet fiber examples illustrate the conven-
tional account of risk in adjudication.  This account of risk specifies a
proof threshold, quantifies the value of evidence, and determines
whether the evidence surpasses the threshold.  Similar risks arise when
the factual finding itself requires quantification.  The next two exam-
ples illustrate this phenomenon.39
Suppose a criminal defendant is arrested and convicted of illegally
importing and possessing heroin.40  His sentence will depend, in part,
on the total quantity of heroin that he smuggled.  Suppose further that
the defendant was arrested on a flight from Nigeria with 427 grams of
heroin in his possession.  The prosecution presents evidence that the
defendant took seven other smuggling trips to Nigeria, and presents
data detailing the quantity of heroin recovered from 177 other Niger-
ian heroin smugglers arrested at the same airport during the period of
the defendant’s trips.  Pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the sen-
tencing judge must make a factual finding regarding the total amount
of heroin the defendant smuggled.  Based on the data and the number
of defendant’s trips, the judge could conclude that he smuggled
37. This example is based on the one presented in Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce
Levin, On the Probative Value of Evidence from a Screening Search, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 265,
266–69 (2003).
38. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1023–25
(1977).
39. These types of issues interact in cases of quantification.  For example, a plaintiff
may have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered a quantified
amount of damages.  We put aside this additional complexity for purposes of the analysis
to follow, as nothing turns on it.
40. See United States v. Shonubi, 962 F. Supp. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v.
Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997).
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between 1,000 and 3,000 grams of heroin, and accordingly sentence the
defendant.
Suppose 3,000 plaintiffs bring lawsuits claiming that they were
injured by a product negligently manufactured by the defendant.41
After the defendant is found negligent, individual damage awards are
determined by “sampling” the cases, rather than holding 3,000 separate
trials.  Sampling requires the court to first divide the plaintiffs into dif-
ferent classes based on similar characteristics, and then to hold trials for
a select number of “representative cases” in each class to determine the
compensatory damages for plaintiffs within each class.  For instance, in
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., the court divided the plaintiffs into five
different groups based on the types of injuries alleged, and assigned all
plaintiffs to one of the groups.42  The court then held trials for 20 “rep-
resentative cases” in each group, and awarded damages for each cate-
gory based on the average award in the representative cases.
IV. FROM RISK TO SUPER-RISK
The actuarial models explored in the previous Parts are based on a
single basic assumption—the projectability assumption.  According to this
assumption, data about some set of individuals or events are thought to
apply to another set of individuals or events.  The inferences based on
this assumption project into the future, the past, or the present.  For
instance, regarding financial decision-making, the projectability
assumption posits that historical measures of key factors, such as volatil-
ity, are good indicators of future measures of those factors.  In other
words, the projectability assumption suggests that the historical mea-
sures will project into the future.  Similarly, regarding fact-finding at
trial, the projectability assumption holds that data about one set is a
good guide to what happened in the past; in other words, that the evi-
dence projects into the past.  The projectability assumption also main-
tains that data about current conditions is a good guide to other
current conditions.  For example, data about injuries in “sample” cases
can be used to predict injuries in other cases.
If the projectability assumption is valid, then using a model based
on known variables to make decisions is an instance of actuarial deci-
sion-making.  However, what is the consequence if the projectability
assumption is flawed, if historical measures of volatility and correlation
do not project into the future, if evidence does not project into the
past, or if “sample” cases do not project to other cases?  If the
projectability assumption fails, then all bets are off, because the risk
41. The trial court in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex.
1990), proposed such a sampling plan for asbestos litigation. Id. at 651–53.  However, the
sampling plan was reversed on appeal. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297,
335 (5th Cir. 1998).  For recent defenses of the use of such sampling plans, see Lahav,
supra note 11 and Cheng, supra note 11.
42. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (where the trial court divided the
plaintiffs into five different classes based on the diseases they contracted from their expo-
sure to asbestos—mesothelioma, lung cancer, other cancer, asbestosis, and pleural
diseases).
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measures do not apply.  With regard to financial decision-making, risk
measures may indicate how assets have behaved in the past, but they
give no guide as to how they might behave in the future.  In adjudica-
tion, risk measures would also be poor guides as to the likelihood of
particular facts being true.  If the projectability assumption does not
hold, then investments and adjudicative decisions are similar to what
Knight called “decision-making under uncertainty.”
When the projectability assumption fails, however, decision-makers
relying on the models are not exactly in the same position as someone
who is knowingly making a decision under uncertainty.  Someone know-
ingly making a decision under uncertainty knows that she cannot assign
numbers to the different outcomes.  The decision-maker also knows
that she must take a different approach.  For instance, when making
financial or policy decisions, a different approach would include adopt-
ing a “minimax” strategy and choosing the option that has the least-bad
worst-case scenario.43  With legal adjudication, decision-makers may
adopt different inferential strategies, such as comparing competing
explanations of the evidence and the events rather than trying to quan-
tify the value of the evidence and compare it with a probabilistic
threshold.44
Unfortunately—and most critically—decision-makers are often not
in a position to know at the time of decision whether the projectability
assumption holds.  Someone applying the CAPM to financial decisions
needs to know whether the historical measures are going to project into
the future.  Decision-makers can certainly measure how well the model
has projected into the future up to the point of decision—but not
whether the historical projectability will continue.  Similarly, the legal
decision-maker needs to know whether evidence will project into the
past or whether “sample” cases project to other cases.  Like financial
decision-makers who cannot predict the future, legal adjudicators often
are not in a position to “postdict” the past or determine how well the
samples project to current cases.  Indeed, adjudication typically
presents a worse epistemic situation than financial decisions because it
will eventually be known whether the historical data projected in finan-
cial decisions, whereas with adjudication, it may never be determined
whether the projectability assumption failed.45
In both contexts, decision-makers do not know whether the
assumption holds at the time of decision.  Therefore, they do not know
43. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L. J. 901, 927–34 (2011) (discussing dif-
ferent ways to model uncertainty).  Much discussion of modeling uncertainty is framed by
the discussion of LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 5.  Other authors have examined cases that
neither fit the standard model of decision-making under risk, nor count as decision-mak-
ing under complete uncertainty. See, e.g., Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Rational Belief, 6 BEHAV-
IORAL & BRAIN SCI. 231 (1983); Levi, Paradoxes, supra note 18.
44. See Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27
L. & PHIL. 223 (2008).
45. Although technological advancements, particularly developments in DNA tech-
nology, have provided some information about errors made at trials, especially the rate of
false criminal convictions, there is a lack of information regarding the accuracy of civil
and criminal trials.
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which kind of decision-making they are engaging in—risky or uncer-
tain—which creates the possibility of decision-making under “super-
risk.”  Super-risk situations arise when there is an appearance of deci-
sion-making under risk (i.e., actuarial decision-making) and when deci-
sion-makers try to project the measures of risk, but where the measures
may not in fact project.  Super-risk is a special type of “epistemic risk,”
where the risk is that one’s model of risk assessment is faulty.46  More
specifically, epistemic risk is not simply the risk of being mistaken or
unjustified in one’s probability assignments; rather, it is the risk of
using a fundamentally mistaken model of reasoning.  The risk of engag-
ing in a fundamentally mistaken kind of decision-making may indeed
include the risk of relying on a mistaken probability, but the latter is
not an instance of the former.
The projection of risk measures creates a pattern.  If a particular
financial entity, for example, falls under a pattern, then the generaliza-
tion describing the pattern can be used to predict the entity’s behavior.
If this occurs, and if the historical generalization is sufficiently precise,
then it is a situation of actuarial decision-making.  But if, on the other
hand, the financial entity does not fall under the pattern, then decision-
makers are in a completely different situation—a situation of decision-
making under uncertainty—which is much more dangerous because it
carries with it the illusion of actuarial decision-making.
Similar considerations apply to adjudication.  If a particular event,
party, or disputed factual issue falls under a pattern, then the general-
ization describing the pattern can be used to draw inferences about the
particular event, party, or legal issue.  These inferences may involve
postdictions, predictions, or judgments about current conditions.  But
if, on the other hand, the event, party, or disputed issue does not fall
under the pattern, then decision-makers are engaging in decision-mak-
ing under uncertainty, with the added danger that it appears to be a
case of actuarial decision-making.  In both the financial and the legal
examples, the main point is that, at the moment of decision-making,
the decision-maker is acting in conditions of risk or uncertainty, but the
decision-maker does not know which one, which is the ultimate danger
of super-risk.
V. UNDERSTANDING SUPER-RISK
Super-risk arises from general features of certain types of decision-
making that are prominent in both financial and legal decision-making
situations.  These features, however, potentially exist in actuarial deci-
sion-making in the contexts of the physical and social sciences,
medicine, and other domains.  Comparing the legal and financial con-
texts with aspects of these other domains further reveals the nature of
super-risk and the conditions that give rise to it.
To appreciate the general features of super-risk, two concepts must
be examined in the abstract: generalizations and patterns.  For our pur-
46. See Ga¨rdenfors & Sahlin, supra note 8.
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poses, generalizations are descriptions of patterns, and patterns are regu-
larities in the world.  In financial decision-making, correlation
coefficients and measures of relative volatility are generalizations
describing patterns in the world.  Similarly, with adjudication, statistical
evidence, likelihood ratios, and sample cases are generalizations
describing patterns in the world.
Projection works by placing new cases or examples under the
description and inferring that the pattern will continue with the new
cases or examples.  This is true when we use a generalization to predict
economic activity, to convict a criminal defendant, or to diagnose a
medical condition.47  When we use a generalization to predict how
some object will behave, or how some event will turn out, we are assum-
ing that the object or event is relevantly similar to the objects or events
in the pattern that the generalization describes.  We are also assuming
this when we use a generalization to postdict behavior, or how some
event turned out in the past, and when we use a generalization to infer
conclusions about current conditions.  These are inferences that we
make all the time.  It is no exaggeration to say that our daily life
depends upon constantly applying what we call the projectability
assumption—the assumption that patterns that we have identified will
project.
Super-risk arises when there is a disconnect between two different
properties in the generalizations relied upon in decision-making: the
explanatory property and the projectability property.  Generalizations have
the explanatory property when they describe a genuinely existing pat-
tern in the world.48  Generalizations have the projectability property
when the pattern described by the generalization could be extended to
new cases and could thus be relied upon by a decision-maker to draw
inferences about new cases.  Super-risk arises when the generalizations
relied upon have the explanatory property, but lack the projectability
property.49  This creates a particular type of inferential problem
47. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 55–56 (“[T]he trier of fact in a criminal court is in a
situation that is analogous in some respects to that of a diagnostic physician . . . .  The
trier of fact, like the physician, cannot base his verdict merely on a high mathematical
probability. . . .  The point is that the reliability of a generalisation, in experimental sci-
ence as also elsewhere, is best graded . . . by the variety of potentially relevant circum-
stances that fail to falsify it.”).
48. See id. at 60 (“[T]he patient’s condition may be so well understood that an eval-
uation in terms of mathematical probability would be superfluous, because so much of
the causal process at work has been established . . . .”); BISHOP & TROUT, supra note 4, at
47 (distinguishing between grounded and ungrounded “statistical prediction rules”;
grounded statistical prediction rules are ones for which “we have a theoretical explana-
tion for their success”).
49. The fact that super-risk arises from some generalizations with the explanatory
property is the reason that the phenomenon of super-risk is distinct from whether the
underlying generalization is reliable or “weighty.” See Cohen, supra note 4, at 55–56.  The
projectability property, as we construe it, is broader than what Alex Stein has recently
referred to as the “extendibility presumption.”  Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Founda-
tion of Law and Economics, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 199, 221 (2011).  Relying on Mill, Stein’s
analysis correctly points out that probabilistic generalizations may be epistemically prob-
lematic if they fail to track genuine causal patterns in the world (the “extendibility pre-
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whereby decision-making has the appearance of taking place in condi-
tions of risk, due to the explanatory property, but is actually taking
place in conditions of uncertainty, because the projectability property is
absent.50
We will now spell out in general terms how the link between the
explanatory property and the projectability property could be broken.
Thereafter, two particular causes of super-risk will be examined: the
“reference class” problem and feedback loops.
Generalizations which have the explanatory property, tracking
existing patterns in the world, typically hold in virtue of causal connec-
tions (and hence will not rest simply upon observed correlation).51  For
example, consider the “Dogs of the Dow” investment strategy, which
instructs an investor to renew her portfolio each year by buying the 10
stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average with the highest dividend
yield.52  The strategy is based on the observation that large, blue chip
companies with a high dividend yield have annually outperformed their
peers with lower yields.  If the generalization underpinning the “Dogs
of the Dow” strategy has the explanatory property, this is so because the
relatively high dividend yield plays a causal role in the “Dogs” out-
performing the other companies in the index.  Similarly, generaliza-
tions regarding legal fact-finding may also display the explanatory
property.  For example, plaintiffs in “sample” tort cases may have suf-
fered the particular injuries and damages because they were exposed to
and injured by the same product.
The potential for super-risk arises because, even when generaliza-
tions have the explanatory property, those generalizations might still
fail to project.  Consider again the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy.  Any two
sumption” presumes that they do). See id.  The extendibility presumption resembles what
we call the explanatory property:
An occurrence of feature B in numerous cases of A does not, by and of itself,
establish that B might occur in a future case of A.  Only evidence of causation
can establish that this future occurrence is probable.  This evidence needs to
identify the causal forces bringing about the conjunctive occurrence of A and B.
Identification of those forces needs to rely on a plausible causal theory demon-
strating that B’s presence in cases of A is law-bound rather than accidental.
Id.  Even generalizations that possess the explanatory property and track causal relation-
ships may nevertheless fail to project, and thus give rise to super-risk.
50. There are three types of inferential problems that are not instances of super-
risk: (1) some decisions will be errors (this is just a feature of actuarial decision-making);
(2) some generalizations relied on may be based on incorrect data; and (3) the connec-
tion between the pattern and the projected cases could be purely coincidental (this is just
the plain, old-fashioned risk that you have mistaken a coincidental correlation for a causal
one). See PEARL, supra note 4.
51. See Cohen, supra note 4; BISHOP & TROUT, supra note 4, at 47 (noting that for
any ungrounded statistical rule “there may well be a neat causal explanation for its success
that we don’t know yet”).  For further discussion of the relationship between explanation
and causation, see STATHIS PSILLOS, CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION (John Shand ed., 2002);
CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION (Joseph Keim Campbell et al. eds., 2007).
52. See MICHAEL B. O’HIGGINS & JOHN MCCARTY, BEATING THE DOW WITH BONDS
(1999) (the publication in which the “Dogs of the Dow” was first proposed).  The divi-
dend yield of a share is calculated by dividing the dividend per share by the price of the
share.
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companies might be similar along one dimension (e.g., high dividend
yields), but will certainly be dissimilar along many other dimensions.  A
strategy like the “Dogs of the Dow” may fail with a particular company
because one or more of the dissimilarities between it and other blue
chip companies trump the similarity—that both are blue chip compa-
nies with high dividend yields.  Assume the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy
is based on a genuine generalization which captures more than just a
correlation.  In other words, the strategy is not merely that the compa-
nies with a high relative dividend yield have outperformed the index,
but that they have outperformed the index because they have a high
dividend yield.  Nonetheless, there are other contributing factors: the
companies from whose performance the ‘Dogs of the Dow’ strategy has
been extrapolated resemble each other in some respects (including
high relative yield), but not in others.  The general point is that
(outside the realm of fundamental physics, and perhaps even there)
explanatory generalizations always rely, either implicitly or explicitly, on
a ceteris paribus clause that allows for a range of circumstances in which
the generalization can fail to hold.53  Thus, generalizations could fail to
project while still being explanatory when one of the potential defeaters
is in play—even if the relevant generalization is explanatory in the
sense that it tracks a genuine pattern in the world.
Compare this with actuarial decision-making in the context of life
insurance.  If an actuary says that smokers of a given age are more likely
to die in the next twelve months than non-smokers of the same age,
then we can be reasonably confident that smoking is the key contribut-
ing factor to the difference in life expectancy.  Life insurers typically do
not have to ask very many more questions before fixing a price for the
policy.  The reason, of course, is that they (and we) have a pretty clear
view of the machinery that leads from smoking to a lower life expec-
tancy.  We understand the health consequences of smoking, and how
they impact mortality rates.54
53. The nineteenth century economist Alfred Marshall understood this point very
clearly as applied to economics:
The forces to be dealt with are however so numerous, that it is best to take a few
at a time; and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our
main study. Thus we begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand
and price in regard to a particular commodity.  We reduce to inaction all other
forces by the phrase “other things being equal”: we do not suppose that they are
inert, but for the time we ignore their activity.  This scientific device is a great
deal older than science: it is the method by which, consciously or unconsciously,
sensible men have dealt from time immemorial with every difficult problem of
ordinary life.
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS xx (8th ed. 1920) (emphasis added). See
DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS (1992).  For
general philosophical discussions, see Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of
Science as a Working Hypothesis), 28 SYNTHESE 97 (1974); DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980); John Earman et al., Ceteris Paribus Lost, 57 ERKENNTNIS 281
(2002).
54. BISHOP & TROUT, supra note 4; see also that “many good examples of grounded
[statistical prediction rules] come from medicine.” Id. at 48.  In discussing variables that
predict prostate cancer, they explain that for three of the variables “we understand very
well why . . . those variables help to reliably predict the target property.” Id.
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But the same does not hold for companies and dividend yields.
There is nothing corresponding to medical understanding of how
smoking contributes to cancer, emphysema, cardiovascular disease, and
so on.  Even if we assume that there is a historically robust “Dogs of the
Dow” phenomenon, our understanding of why it might occur is funda-
mentally different from the actuarial case.  We know that relative divi-
dend yield is a causal factor, but we have no idea what the other causal
factors might be.  And this is not very surprising, given the massive dif-
ferences between the companies involved.  This means that we cannot
be confident that the robust generalization we have identified in the
past will carry over to the case to which we are trying to apply it.  There
remains the possibility that new cases will prove to be counterexamples,
not instances—even though the generalization is tracking a causal
connection.
This is why decision-making in financial markets is so often deci-
sion-making under super-risk.  Decision-makers are often working with
generalizations that they have good reason to think have the explana-
tory property.  These generalizations typically make it seem that deci-
sions are being made under actuarial conditions.55  At the same time,
however, these generalizations will always have an “all other things
being equal” clause built into them, either explicitly or (more often)
implicitly.  In almost all interesting cases, it is impossible to spell out
completely what these “other things” might be, or what counts as “being
equal.”
This fundamental problem applies to each of the four legal exam-
ples as well.  First, even if there is a real causal generalization underly-
ing the sample tort cases (based on the similarity that all plaintiffs were
injured by the same product), there may be many dissimilarities among
the class of plaintiffs.56  These dissimilarities may be legally significant
and thus make the non-sample cases counterexamples rather than
extensions of the patterns identified.  Second, even if there is a robust
generalization about the behavior of Nigerian heroin smugglers, the
defendant in any given case, or defendants in a series of cases, may not
be typical Nigerian heroin smugglers.57  Third, even if the Blue Cab
Company owns eighty percent of the cabs in town, they may hire safer
drivers than other companies and its cabs may be involved in only ten
percent of the cab accidents in town.58  Finally, even if the carpet fiber
found at the crime scene and the defendant’s home is rare in carpets
55. There are broader psychological issues involved also. Daniel Ellsberg drew
attention to the psychological phenomenon of ambiguity aversion. See Ellsberg, supra
note 18.  There is robust evidence that decision-makers regularly breach the axioms of
expected utility theory when they are dealing with probabilities that are not numerically
determinate, but rather fall into a range.  The fact that people typically prefer to deal with
numbers rather than with ranges could be one source of the phenomenon under discus-
sion. Id.
56. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d, 151
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). See also Lahav, supra note 11; Cheng, supra note 11.
57. See United States v. Shonubi, 962 F. Supp. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), vacated, 103 F.3d
1085 (2d Cir. 1997).
58. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 36.
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manufactured nationally, the fiber may be common in carpets sold at
the local carpet store.59  As with the financial example, in each of these
examples there are both (1) reasons for legal decision-makers to think
they have identified generalizations describing actual patterns in the
world, and (2) reasons why the generalizations may not project to the
new cases.
Actuarial decision-making—assigning numbers to the probabilities
of different outcomes and measuring risk—is a perfectly reasonable way
to proceed, to the extent that you have evidence that you are working
with patterns that have the explanatory property.  But, of course, this
depends upon the assumption that explanatory patterns will project.
Or, to put it another way, it rests upon the tacit assumption that gener-
alizations that have the explanatory property also have the projectability
property.  In cases of actuarial decision-making in the insurance con-
text, and in many scientific and medical contexts, this assumption is
well-founded.60  Actuarial generalizations project to new cases.  If you
have good evidence that a particular factor (for example, smoking) has
had a particular effect (such as decreasing life expectancy) in the past,
then that gives you license to make predictions about the future.  You
can use those predictions to write your insurance policies with confi-
dence (assuming that you write a sufficient amount of them for the
statistics to work in your favor).
The link between the explanatory and projectability properties typ-
ically holds in the physical sciences as well.  If we have evidence that
some apparent generalization in physics, for example, fails to project to
new cases, then we should suspect that the explanatory property doesn’t
hold.  There may be some complex scientific phenomena that cannot
be understood in terms of actuarial generalizations.  Climate change
may be an example.  But much of science, particularly basic science, is
actuarial (in our sense).  In many types of scientific generalizations, in
other words, the explanatory property and the projectability property
stand or fall together.61
But generally this does not hold for financial markets and legal
adjudication.  Certain distinctive features of each break the link
between the explanatory property and the projectability property.  And
so we end up in decision-making under super-risk, the situation of mak-
ing decisions under what we take to be actuarial conditions when we
might actually be operating in a situation of uncertainty rather than
risk.62
We now look at two particular sources of super-risk.  These sources
provide reasons why the explanatory and projectability properties may
come apart in legal and financial decision-making.
59. See Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 37.
60. See, e.g., BISHOP & TROUT, supra note 4; Dawes et al., supra note 4.
61. Cf. ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, ECONOMICS—MATHEMATICAL POLITICS OR SCIENCE OF
DIMINISHING RETURNS? (1992) (distinguishing economics from the sciences based on the
former’s failure to achieve similar predictive successes).
62. See, e.g., HAUSMAN, supra note 53.
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The first is the reference-class problem.63  In adjudication, infer-
ences drawn from statistical evidence about a particular event depend
on placing the event within a particular reference class, the class
described by the data.64  The reference class provides the generaliza-
tion describing the pattern that will then be applied to the particular
event.65  The particular event, however, is a member of a virtually infi-
nite number of other reference classes, each of which may provide
widely different generalizations describing different patterns.66  For
example, even though the Blue Cab Company owns eighty percent of
the buses in the town, suppose again that it causes ten percent of the
accidents.  Then, even though the “80 percent” generalization
describes a real pattern in the world, it will not project to cases like the
bus accident.  If it did project, then in ten similar cases (all of which will
result in judgments against the Blue Cab Company) we would expect
eight correct decisions and two errors—what we would get instead are
nine errors and one correct decision.
The reference-class problem is a general one that applies to adjudi-
cation as well as to financial decision-making.  Differences between
members of the class described in any given generalization, on one
hand, and the target cases, on the other, point to other reference clas-
ses to which the target cases are members.  Any of these differences may
be a reason why the generalization fails to project to the target cases.67
The pattern of carpet fibers in the United States may be a different
pattern than carpet fibers in Anytown, USA; the pattern of Nigerian
heroin drug smugglers may be different from the pattern of Nigerian
heroin drug smugglers over the age of 30; the pattern of people injured
by a product may be different from people with high blood pressure
injured by a product; and the pattern of companies with a high divi-
dend yield may be different from the pattern of companies with a high
dividend yield that also issue fraudulent financial statements.  The ref-
erence-class problem reveals one way in which generalizations may
describe a real pattern in the world but fail to project to new cases.
A second way the explanatory and projectability properties can
come apart is when reliance on the generalizations undermines the
generalizations.  This process can occur with both financial and legal
decision-making.  We illustrate first with a financial example, again
involving the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy.
Patterns in the behavior of financial assets can be self-destructive.
When investors notice the patterns and start to act upon them, their
very actions can cause the patterns to cease to hold.  If investors realize
that the “Dogs of the Dow” will outperform their companions with a
lower dividend yield, then they will adopt the investment strategy of
63. Alan Ha´jek, The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too, 156 SYNTHESE 563
(2007); see also Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007).
64. Ha´jek, supra note 63, at 564.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 567.
67. Id. at 565.
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buying those underappreciated and overperforming companies.  This
will drive their share price up and the end result will be that they stop
being underappreciated and overperforming.  There is some evidence
that this is what actually happened to the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy.68
This phenomenon works both ways.  If you think you have spotted
an anomaly in the market, then you would be wise to consider the
probability of other people spotting the very same anomaly.  Unless you
are doing something illegal, the information you have is shared by
other investors.  So you should consider the possibility that there isn’t
an anomaly there at all because, if there were one, the market would
already have closed it down.  The efficient-markets hypothesis general-
izes this type of argument.69  In a sense this phenomenon is not very
mysterious.  It is simply an example of what is often called the principle
of no arbitrage—the principle that markets will close down any oppor-
tunity for a risk-free profit as soon as it appears.70  There is a related
phenomenon in social policy.  Goodhart’s Law states that when policy-
makers explicitly target a given economic indicator (such as a given
level of inflation) this changes its indicator function (e.g., what it tells
us about unemployment).71
Neither the efficient-markets hypothesis nor Goodhart’s Law is by
itself a source of super-risk, but the “Dogs of the Dow” example illus-
trates a fundamental fact about financial markets that does provide a
source of super-risk.  Financial markets move the way they do because
of how investors behave.  Investors behave the way they do because of
how financial markets have moved in the past, and how they expect
them to move in the future.  This gives rise to a feedback loop that
George Soros has labeled “reflexivity.”72  Here is how Soros describes
reflexivity:
In situations that have thinking participants, there is a two-way
interaction between the participants’ thinking and the situation in
which they participate.  On the one hand, participants seek to
understand reality; on the other, they seek to bring about a
desired outcome.  The two functions work in opposite directions:
in the cognitive function reality is the given; in the participating
function, the participants’ understanding is the constant.  The two
functions can interfere with each other by rendering what is sup-
posed to be given, contingent.  I call the interference between the
two functions “reflexivity.”  I envision reflexivity as a feedback loop
between the participants’ understanding and the situation in
68. Grant McQueen et al., Does the “Dow-10 Investment Strategy” Beat the Dow Statisti-
cally and Economically?, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 66 (1997).
69. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
70. See Hal R. Varian, The Arbitrage Principle in Financial Economics, 1 J. ECON. PERSP.
55 (1987).
71. Charles A.E. Goodhart, Problems of Monetary Management: The U.K. Experience, in
PAPERS IN MONETARY ECONOMICS (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975).
72. GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY OF FINANCE: READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET 2
(2003).
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which they participate, and I contend that the concept of reflexiv-
ity is crucial to understanding situations that have thinking
participants.73
Soros illuminates the reflexivity of financial markets (and has also prof-
ited from it rather impressively).  The reflexivity that Soros describes is
a fundamental source of super-risk.
Detecting historical patterns can lead investors to behave in certain
ways.  This is the first part of Soros’s feedback loop between informa-
tion and participation.  But then, and this is the second part of the
loop, that behavior can fundamentally alter the basis for the generaliza-
tion—participation can change the information base.  The run-up to
the recent financial crisis provides a very clear illustration of this.  As is
by now very well-documented, the pricing of mortgage-backed securi-
ties—securities that are backed by packages of mortgages on residential
or commercial properties—was determined by the risk of the underly-
ing assets defaulting.  This risk was typically measured with reference to
historical default rates.  The models for pricing these securities based
on the historical data allowed the securities to be sliced and diced into
different layers or tranches, each yielding a different rate of return cor-
responding to a different level of perceived risk.
What happened next is well-known.  Banks and mortgage compa-
nies started both selling mortgages to individuals who would never pre-
viously have qualified for loans and offering new types of mortgage
products.  They did so, in part, by assuming the projectability of historical
default rates into the future.74  This behavior ensured that the histori-
cal rates did not project.  Default rates ended up far above their histori-
cal levels, and mortgage-backed securities turned into “toxic assets.”75
This illustrates how the reflexivity of financial markets can lead
generalizations and patterns to undermine themselves.  Mortgage com-
panies and securitization bankers correctly identified a robust historical
pattern of repayment and default in residential and commercial mort-
gages.  They assumed that this pattern would project into the future
and fed it into their models.  This had the direct consequence that the
pattern undermined itself.  The mortgage industry eventually discov-
ered that they were working with a pattern that had the explanatory
property but not the projectability property.
This type of reflexivity arises in legal contexts as well.  The fact that
a generalization is relied on in one case is a reason for parties (particu-
larly, so-called “repeat players”) to take advantage of or to seek to
undermine the generalization in future cases.  Evidentiary rules and
73. Id.
74. In its report on the causes of the financial crisis, the U.S. Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission noted that, “[f]inancial institutions and credit rating agencies
embraced mathematical models as reliable predictors of risks, replacing judgment in too
many instances.  Too often, risk management became risk justification.” FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xix (2011). See also POSNER, supra
note 9 (noting the significant role played by problematic mathematical models of risk in
the financial crisis).
75. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 74, at 480.
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legal judgments affect primary (i.e., non-litigation) behavior and
changes in primary behavior affect generalizations and their
projectability in future cases.76  If the hypothetical Blue Cab Company
lost one case based on evidence of the number of buses in the town it
owns, we can imagine it would take steps to undermine the
projectability of this generalization to any future cases—by, for exam-
ple, hiring safe drivers and generating evidence that tracks the exact
locations of their buses or perhaps placing cameras on the buses.  As
this example illustrates, “undermining” the projectability of generaliza-
tions through such reflexivity may be a good thing in some instances.
For another example, if the police can use data about patterns of crimi-
nal behavior to predict where certain crimes are likely to occur, then
deploying more police officers to those areas may indeed reduce the
current patterns and undermine the generalizations describing them.77
Likewise, in the medical context, the presence of certain risk factors
may be a good predictor for developing a particular disease, but pos-
sessing these factors may thereby cause people to change their behavior
to decrease the odds of developing the disease.  Nevertheless, this type
of reflexivity provides a fundamental way in which the explanatory and
projectability properties may diverge and thus is a source of super-risk.
CONCLUSION
Adjudication is a process of drawing uncertain inferences about
the past, present, or future.  Investment is a process of making educated
guesses about the future.  The stock in trade of both enterprises is, as it
is throughout the physical and social sciences, perceived similarities
and potential patterns.  The complexity of the financial world and the
ingenuity of its inhabitants have created almost endless possibilities for
perceiving similarities and identifying patterns.  The complexity and
the endless variety of issues that give rise to adjudication create similar
possibilities.  The patterns identified in each domain can often be made
numerically precise.
Therefore, from the perspectives of law and finance, decision-mak-
ing can all too easily have the appearance of being actuarial, akin to
insurance and some aspects of the physical sciences.  But that is often a
mistake.  Instead, it is decision-making under super-risk.  This occurs
when decision-makers identify precise patterns—e.g., the past behavior
of financial entities or statistical evidence about a class of events or indi-
viduals.  These patterns can be made numerically precise using a variety
of tools.  For the financial analyst, these include expected return, beta,
dividend yield, and so on.  For the legal fact-finder, these include statis-
tical evidence, likelihood ratios, Bayes’ Theorem, and probabilistic stan-
dards of proof.  But the apparent numerical precision in these domains
76. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary
Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and
the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001).
77. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY
L.J. 259 (2012).
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may flatter to deceive.  Decision-makers are often in a position of super-
risk because, while they may be basing decisions on genuine explana-
tory patterns, they have no way of knowing whether these patterns have
the projectability property.
Ordinary risk can be measured and tamed.  An insurer who writes
a single insurance policy may get badly burned.  But if insurers write
enough policies, then on balance they are likely to come out ahead.
Can super-risk be tamed in this way? Our instinct is that it cannot.  But
that is a topic for another time.  Our principal aim in this Article has
been to introduce the important, but thus far neglected, concept of
super-risk.
